Journal of Business and Policy Research Vol.3 No.2 Nov-Dec 2007, Pp.64-82

Investors' behaviour in the Chinese Stock Exchanges: Empirical Evidence in a Systemic Approach

Caterina Lucarelli* and Giulio Palomba**

This paper investigates the Chinese mainland Stock Exchanges and their following interconnecting features: savers' attitude towards stock investments, investors' trading behaviour and stock returns explanations. We evaluate the effectiveness of the recent efforts made by the Chinese authorities to improve the level of legal protections for shareholders and the opening-up of the Chinese Stock Markets to foreign investors. The whole analysis is carried out through a system of simultaneous equations. The main results are that Chinese shareholders and stock markets are mostly driven by emotional behaviour. Stock market returns are barely influenced by the overall Chinese economic booming, but reveal the presence of speculative influences. Investors' behaviour, as well as general trading activities, hardly seems to be affected by the legal framework introduced by the national Authorities.

Field of research: Chinese Stock Exchanges, shareholders' rights, corporate governance, investors' behaviour, system of simultaneous equations.

JEL: C30, F30, G18

1. Introduction

This article aims to describe the interconnecting features of the Chinese Stock Exchanges using a systematic approach. The various characteristics of a stock market interact with each other, giving rise to a series of complex relationships. It has been shown that the increase in the number of stock investment accounts may depend upon the level of the stock market returns, as well as the level of trust that savers place upon share investment (La Porta *et al.*, 2002). At the same time, this "trust" also influences stock trading volumes, which are clearly affected by the evolution of stock investment accounts.

^{*}Corresponding author. Department of Economics, Università Politecnica delle Marche, piazzale Martelli 8, 60121, Ancona, Italy. <u>c.lucarelli@univpm.it</u>.

^{**}Department of Economics, Università Politecnica delle Marche. g.palomba@univpm.it.

These simple examples point to the complexities that we have to deal with when drawing up such a unique market scenario such as that for the Chinese Stock Exchanges. In fact, as far as the mainland stock markets are concerned, we have to consider two different Stock Exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (hereafter SHSE) and the Shenghen Stock Exchange (hereafter SZSE), as well as two sub-set of shares, *A*-shares and *B*-shares.

The *A*-share markets have traditionally been available for Chinese savers only, and the access of foreigners only allowed under the strict control of the Chinese Authorities, according to the "Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor-QFII" formula of 2002. The *B*-share markets, on the other hand, are specific for foreigner investments, even if they have been open to the Chinese citizens since the beginning of 2001. Moreover, since 1999, the Chinese Authorities have been promoting a reshaping of the national stock market regulatory framework, involving considerable changes that would improve the savers legal rights system and widen the number of shareholders in favour of foreign investors (CSRC, 2003, 2004 and 2005).

The chinese stock markets provide good investor opportunities due to the large number of potential investors and to the fast increase of per capita income as seen over the last few years. The average growth rate for wages is above 13% and the saving rate is at almost 40% (Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China). The overall positive attitude of the Chinese towards stock investments should also to be taken into consideration, despite the historical "ideological bias" related to the fact that, until November 2002 (and the 16th Chinese Communist Party Congress), any income from holding stocks would not have been approved. Given the abundance of savings, stock investments may also be stimulated by the lack of the attractiveness of alternative investment opportunities, such as bonds, real estate or bank deposits. Even if bond investments remain attractive to Chinese savers, other more remunerative opportunities for investments may still arise. In fact, since 2000, many Chinese households have intensified the level of their investment in both residential buildings and economical housing; although recent indications suggest that they may be afraid of a speculative real estate bubble. Regarding bank deposits, the People's Bank of China (PBoC) sources reveal that the percentage rate of Household Savings Deposits grew from 7% in 2000 to 16% in 2002. Even if wages and saving rates are still steadily increasing, the upward trend of this rate surprisingly turned upside down in 2004, dropping to 9%. Hence, we may argue that those savings are (or may be "emotionally") attractive for stock investments opportunities.

Furthermore, the free-floating of Chinese shares is very low compared to Western standards (on average 30% of the total shares issued). A full two-thirds of the Chinese stock market capitalisation is still tied up in non tradable or "legal person" shares held by state controlled entities⁽¹⁾. This is due to historical and political reasons of the Chinese stock markets' growth that were related to the partial sell-off of the State Owned Enterprise (SOEs) capital shares. In fact, the Initial Public Offers (IPOs) and raising funds operations are under strict political control (Chen,

2003). This may explain the strong divergence between the Chinese GDP development and the stock index performances. In fact, until 2001, as the GDP grew, the stock markets' trends were positive, while as it decreased, their trends were bearish (see Figure 1). This positive relationship is traditionally expected, as a general phenomenon of a virtuous interrelationship between financial and economic development⁽²⁾.

As a consequence, the more an economy grows, the more the listed companies, which should have contributed to such growth, would increase their market value. On the contrary, starting from 2002, the stock markets indexes have shrunk, although the Chinese GDP has maintained a steady growth. This may be related to the fact that the major part of the stock markets (almost 80%) refers to big and not particularly efficient SOEs, that have been listed by the Chinese government in order to settle financial troubles (Chen, 2003). We could argue that the companies responsible for the Chinese development are unlikely to be listed in the Chinese stock markets.



Figure 1: Chinese Stock Exchanges vs. Chinese GDP - percentage changes

Source: DATASTREAM

An important remark is that since 2001, the Chinese Authorities have been promoting the reshaping of the national stock market regulatory framework, with considerable efforts for both improving the saver legal rights system and widening the shareholders' base in favour of foreign investors.

Specifically, we model the Chinese market dynamics with a system of simultaneous equations in order to identify and quantify the level of influence that interacting features have upon the following variables:

- investors' number in terms of stock investment accounts in both the SHSE and the SZSE markets;
- trading volumes, in terms of deals concluded, in both the SHSE and the SZSE markets;
- stock market returns, which represent the performances of the Shanghai and the Shenghen stock indexes.

Moreover, we insert different dummy variables, representing the regulatory interventions enforced in the Chinese Stock Exchanges, in order to test whether these efforts have really been effective in improving and developing the national stock markets. This paper is organized as follows: section 2 consists of a short review of the literature concerning shareholder rights protection system and the main features of the Chinese stock markets, while in Section 3 we carry out the empirical analysis to model the relationship mentioned above. Section 4 summarizes the main results provided by the model estimation and section 5 concludes.

2. Literature Review

The protection of shareholder rights is generally related to a system of corporate governance of a country. Literature has focused on how the legal framework influences the financial development of a country, and it has been asserted that it is important to fully understand the patterns of financial development for different countries⁽³⁾.

According to La Porta et al. (2000), corporate governance can be considered as "a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders". But Chinese corporate governance, in practice, is very different from this view; the Chinese corporate governance reform, started with the Company Law of 1994, was designed to primarily address problems within the State sector and, in particular, to reform traditional State-owned enterprises and their inefficiencies. The key issue relies upon the State policy of maintaining a full or controlling ownership interest in enterprises with different sectors (Clarke, 2003). To reach a paradox, it could mean that Chinese corporate governance is a set of mechanisms through which the main inside investor (the State) protects itself against expropriation by outsiders. Thus, with such a weak corporate governance system, such strong implicit contracts and the insecurity of property rights, as characterised by the Chinese legal framework of the 90s and the beginning of the 00s⁽⁴⁾, the whole and effective fulfilment of a shareholders' legal protection system has not vet been achieved. The literature does confirm the limited protection of minority rights in Asia that allows controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders (Claessens and Fan, 2002).

However, the Chinese Authorities are aware of the urgency for improving the legal system for savers' rights and for widening the shareholders' base, especially in order to foster the opening up of the financial system (and Stock Exchanges) to foreign investors. Indeed, specific rules for corporate governance for listed companies have been systematically issued since 1999 (more than 300 regulatory acts)⁽⁵⁾.All this regulatory activity explains the purpose of our article that is to check whether this new set of rules has been significantly affecting shareholders' behaviour.

3. Methodology

The dataset used in this approach is given by a sample of 93 monthly observations taken from a period that goes from January 1999 to September 2006. The source for data is the Thompson DataStream archives. Table 1 shows a detailed list of all available variables and the corresponding derived variables that enter the model. The SHSE and the SZSE are simply named as market 1 and market 2, while *A* and *B* indicate the *A*-shares and *B*-shares respectively. The derived series are obtained by using 100 times the log difference transformation. This was used for two reasons: firstly, this is a useful approximation of the percentage variations of time series, and secondly, it avoids any problems due to the presence of nonstationary variables. For example, we express the shares returns at time *t* as $r_{ij,t}=100\cdot[\ln(P_{ij,t})-\ln(P_{ij,t-1})]$, where i = A, B (shares), j = 1, 2 (markets) and $P_{ij,t}$ is the share price at time *t*. The variance time series are obtained by exploiting the daily data for *A* and *B*-share returns via the equation

$$\sigma_{ijt} = \frac{1}{T_k} \sum_{t=1}^{T_k} (R_{ijk,t} - \overline{R}_{ijk})^2,$$
(1)

where T_k is the sample size at month k, $R_{ijk,t}$ is the daily return at time t, and \overline{R}_{ijk} is the average return for the share *i* and the market *j* in the *k*-th month.

Moreover, all the endogenous variables in Table 1 were previously filtered in order to avoid seasonality; the main assumption here is that all the seasonal patterns can be modelled using deterministic seasonal dummies, thus time series that enter the model are obtained as residuals of OLS estimation. Table 2 contains the complete list of the regulatory dummies considered in our analysis.

Series	Description	Derived series
	Endogenous variables	
Y A1	A-share investors' number – Shanghai	$i_{A1} = 100 \cdot [\ln y_{A1} - \ln y_{A1}(-1)]$
Y A2	A-share investors' number – Shenghen	$i_{A2} = 100 \cdot [\ln y_{A2} - \ln y_{A2}(-1)]$
y _{B1}	B-share investors' number – Shanghai	$i_{B1} = 100 \cdot [\ln y_{B1} - \ln y_{B1}(-1)]$
У В2	B-share investors' number – Shenghen	$i_{B2} = 100 \cdot [\ln y_{B2} - \ln y_{B2}(-1)]$
V_{A1}	A-share trading volumes – Shanghai	$v_{A1} = 100 \cdot [\ln V_{A1} - \ln V_{A1}(-1)]$
V_{A2}	A-share trading volumes – Shenghen	$v_{A2} = 100 \cdot [\ln V_{A2} - \ln V_{A2}(-1)]$
V_{B1}	B-share trading volumes – Shanghai	$v_{B1} = 100 \cdot [\ln V_{B1} - \ln V_{B1}(-1)]$
V_{B2}	B-share trading volumes – Shenghen	$v_{B2} = 100 \cdot [\ln V_{B2} - \ln V_{B2}(-1)]$
A1	A-share index returns – Shanghai	$r_{A1} = 100 \cdot [\ln A1 - \ln A1(-1)]$
A2	A-share index returns – Shenghen	$r_{A2} = 100 \cdot [\ln A2 - \ln A2(-1)]$
B1	<i>B</i> -share index returns – Shanghai	<i>r</i> _{B1} = 100·[ln <i>B1</i> - ln <i>B1</i> (-1)]
B2	B-share index returns – Shenghen	<i>r</i> _{B2} = 100·[ln <i>B</i> 2- ln <i>B</i> 2(-1)]
	Exogenous variables (instruments	s)
	A-share lagged investors' number – Shanghai	$i_{A1}(-1), i_{A1}(-2)$
	A-share lagged investors' number – Shenghen	$I_{A2}(-1)$
	B-share lagged investors' number – Shanghai	$i_{B1}(-1), i_{B1}(-2)$
	B-share lagged investors' number – Shenghen	$i_{B2}(-1), i_{B2}(-2)$
	A-share lagged trading volumes – Shanghai	$V_{A1}(-1)$
	A-share lagged trading volumes – Shenghen	$V_{A2}(-1), V_{A2}(-2)$
	B-share lagged trading volumes – Shanghai	$V_{B1}(-1), V_{B1}(-2)$
	B-share lagged trading volumes – Shenghen	$V_{B2}(-1), V_{B2}(-2), V_{B2}(-3)$
W_{A1}	A-share weighted average P/E ratio - Shanghai	$w_{A1} = 100 \cdot [\ln W_{A1} - \ln W_{A1}(-1)]$
W_{A2}	A-share weighted average P/E ratio – Shenghen	$w_{A2} = 100 \cdot [\ln W_{A2} - \ln W_{A2}(-1)]$
W_{B1}	B-share weighted average P/E ratio – Shanghai	$W_{B1} = 100 \cdot [\ln W_{B1} - \ln W_{B1}(-1)]$
W_{B2}	B-share weighted average P/E ratio - Shenghen	$w_{B2} = 100 \cdot [\ln W_{B2} - \ln W_{B2}(-1)]$
MV_{A1}	A-share market value - Shanghai	$c_{A1} = 100 \cdot [\ln MV_{A1} - \ln MV_{A1}(-1)]$
		$-r_{A1}$
MV_{A2}	A-share market value – Shenghen	$c_{A2} = 100 \cdot [\ln MV_{A2} - \ln MV_{A2}(-1)]$
		$-r_{A2}$
MV _{B1}	B-share market value – Shanghai	$c_{B1} = 100 \cdot [\ln MV_{B1} - \ln MV_{B1}(-1)]$
	Dahara madatusha Oharahar	$-r_{B1}$
MV _{B2}	B-snare market value – Snengnen	$C_{B2} = 100 \cdot [\ln MV_{B2} - \ln MV_{B2}(-1)]$
-	A share price index deltare turn. Observetsi	- r _{B2}
\mathcal{R}_{A1}	A-snare price index <i>daily</i> return - Shanghai	σ_{A1} = see equation (1)
R_{A2}	A-snare price index daily return - Shenghen	σ_{A2} = see equation (1)
R_{B1}	B-share price index daily return - Shanghai	σ_{B1} = see equation (1)
R_{B2}	B-share price index daily return - Shenghen	σ_{B2} = see equation (1)
SP	S&P monthly composite index	<i>r</i> _{SP} = 100·[ln SP - ln SP(-1)]

Source: DATASTREAM

Dummy	Regulatory event
seclaw	PRC Security Law
opchi	Notice regarding B-share investment by chinese citizens
indir	Guidelines for estabilishing independent directors for listed companies
cgov	Code of corporate governance for listed companies,
	Delisting procedures became effective
qfii	Qualified Foreign Istitutional Investors (QFII) scheme
ipospon	Interim measures on the sponsor system for securities public offering
prodev	Guidelines on promoting reform, opening-up and steady development of chinese capital market
intprot	Rules of strengthening protection of private shareholders' rights and interests,
	Circular on several issues of the initial public offering book-building pricing system
ipores	IPO procedures resumption,
	Extensible Business Report Language for information disclosure of listed companies
	Dummy seclaw opchi indir cgov qfii ipospon prodev intprot

Table 2: Regulatory dummy description

Source: CSRC (2004, 2005 and 2006)

The model consists of a standard system of simultaneous equations, whose structural form at time *t* is

$$B'y_t = \mu + \Gamma'x_t + \varepsilon_t \tag{2}$$

where y_t is an *n*-dimensional vector including all the endogenous variables, x_t is a *k*-dimensional vector with all the exogenous variables in which the dummy variables are included, $\varepsilon_t \sim \text{i.i.d.}(0, \Sigma)$ is the vector of error terms and μ is the vector of constant terms. The matrices *B*' and *I*'contain respectively $(n \times n)$ and $(n \times k)$ coefficients. In this model n = 12 and k = 32; thus, considering the triple (B, Γ, Σ) and the vector of constants μ , the total amount of parameters is n + n(n + k) + 0.5n(n + 1) = 554.

Hence, the main problem with this kind of model is the imposition of restrictions in order to achieve identification of the system. The solution is provided by two sets of constraints; on one hand, the financial markets and economic theory suggest the use of some exclusion constraints, thus some variables are restricted to be zero in some equations. On the other hand, the diagonal of the matrix B' is imposed to be a n-dimensional vector of ones. This set of normalization restrictions is useful for expressing each element of y_t as a function of the other endogenous variables and of all the exogenous variables. Finally, in our model cross-equations restrictions are not set and this allows us to estimate the model equation by equation. Given that

$$y_t = [i_{A1} i_{A2} i_{B1} i_{B2} v_{A1} v_{A2} v_{B1} v_{B2} r_{A1} r_{A2} r_{B1} r_{B2}]',$$

the system substantially consists of three blocks of four equations, taking markets *A*- and *B*-shares into account; in the first block the dependent variables are the changes in the number of stock investment accounts, in the second block the dependent variables are the variations in volumes and the third block is related to

returns. Tables 3, 4 and 5 show all the estimated equations in the system. From the structural form of equation (2), the identification process requires that both the order condition and the rank condition, should be satisfied; the first is a necessary, but generally not sufficient condition and it necessitates that in each equation the number of excluded explanatory variables should be at least as great as the number of the included endogenous variables. The rank condition is a sufficient condition for identification which takes the equation $\Pi B = \Gamma$ into account, where Π' is taken from the reduced form of equation (2)

$$y_t = M + \Pi' x_t + u_t \tag{3}$$

where $M = (B')^{-1}\mu$, $\Pi = (B')^{-1}\Gamma$ and $u_t = (B')^{-1}\varepsilon_t$. The rank condition is satisfied if the restrictions imposed upon the structural form allow one to express any condition in terms of both the parameters belonging to (B, Γ, Σ) and the parameters of the reduced form (Π, Ω) , with $\Omega = V \operatorname{ar}(u_t)$ and $u_t = (B')^{-1}\varepsilon_t$ (see for example Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993).

Given the great number of explanatory variables (or instruments), the order condition is very easy to test in our model, and the set of constraints imposed to the coefficients guarantees that the rank condition is also satisfied.

Tables 3, 4 and 5 report the estimates of our system obtained using both the Two Stages Least Squares (2SLS) and the Three Stages Least Squares (3SLS) estimators. Some standard useful diagnostics, such as the Hausman specification test, the Sargan overidentifying restrictions test, the Godfrey test for autocorrelation and the normaliy test by Jarque-Bera tests, are computed. The degrees of freedom of the chi-squared test statistic are provided in parenthesis for the former two tests, while for the autocorrelation and the normality tests they are fixed to 3 and 2 respectively⁽⁶⁾.

The 2SLS estimator was chosen for both theoretical and practical reasons. First of all, this estimator provides consistent and asymptotic normally distributed estimates and it is the most efficient instrumental variables equation-by-equation estimator given the assumption that the data generating process is a system of simultaneous equations (Sargan, 1988). Second, this method is not different from the instrumental variables equation-by equation estimation therefore, if an error of misspecification occurs in one equation, it does not affect the others. Moreover, each equation is not affected by the overidentifying restrictions of the other equations. The use of the 3SLS estimator especially depends upon practical reasons; even if this method improves efficiency under the assumption of a well specified system. Tables 3, 4 and 5 show that its results are very similar to those provided by 2SLS. Finally, 2SLS and 3SLS are closed-form estimators; hence they do not require any numerical algorithm to achieve convergence.

In the literature regarding the systems of simultaneous equations, alternative estimation methods exist, such as the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) or the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) methods. Even if these

estimators have the usual properties of the ML estimators⁽⁷⁾, they do not have closed-form solutions, they strictly depend on the assumptions regarding the density function of \mathcal{E}_{t} , and they often fail to achieve convergence, especially for finite samples with a small number of observations. Moreover, the results from the Jarque-Bera test often show a rejection of the normality hypothesis and this supports this choice.

4. Discussion of Findings

Tables 3, 4 and 5 summarize the whole analysis, with the equation by equation estimates using both the 2SLS and 3SLS methods. The main statistical findings are:

- the estimation output of 2SLS does not substantially differ from those of 3SLS. This enforces the evidence that our results do not substantially depend upon the estimation method;
- in some cases endogeneity is relevant as pointed out by the Hausman test in which the null hypothesis is often rejected: this confirms that the use of the instrumental variables estimator is often required;
- the Sargan test shows the validity of the instruments used. With a confidence level of 5% the only exception is given by equation 11, but the null hypothesis was not strongly rejected (the *p*-value is 0.0130);
- the Godfrey test always accepted the null of incorrelated residuals⁽⁸⁾;
- the normality of residuals is often rejected and this supports the idea of avoiding estimation via ML estimators;
- the Sargan test performed in the 3SLS estimation provided the following results:
 - Test statistic = 311.340
 - *p*-value = 0.0704 (critical value from a χ^2_{276} distribution).

This confirms the validity of all the instruments used.

4.1 Investors' Number

The following series of findings were identified as relevant from Table 3.

Wave-effects: Chinese savers' behaviour generates waves of stock account subscriptions, characterized by a yearly seasonality, as proved by our preliminarily tests. Moreover, imitative behaviour is relevant: the variations in stock account subscriptions were correlated between the two Stock Exchanges, and frequently between the two segments of shares (*A* and *B*). The stronger interconnections are relevant between the *A*-shares segments; *A*-share investors are influenced by *B*-share investors' choices, while the opposite is less true. Nevertheless, the influence of emotional waves may also be confirmed for *B*-investors, given the positive effect of the S&P performances on the SZSE *B* shares investors' number;

- *Investment memory*: the waves of stock account subscriptions are generally related with their past, thus the amount of investments have a memory. Sometimes the overall effect indicates a reinforcing trend, along time, as in the case of i_{A1} and i_{B1} . In other circumstances the past seems to be competing with the present (competing trend), when the lagged variables enter the current number of investors with some negative effect as in i_{A2} ;
- SHSE leadership: The estimates reveal that SHSE plays a leading role: the coefficient of i_{A2} in equation 1 is 0.3093, while the coefficient of i_{A1} in equation 2 is greater (0.9687). For the *B*-shares segment, the number of investment accounts in SZSE is influenced by that of SHSE market. The opposite effect is not statistically relevant;
- *Market enlargement effect*: in equation 3 the number of *B*-share investors (i_{B1}) is positively affected by the real market enlargement (the real market capitalisation growth, c_{B1}), whereas it is negatively correlated with c_{B2} ;

Equation 1 – Dependent variable: i_{A1}									
var.	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	
μ_1	-0.4881	0.0556	-8.7768	0.0000***	-0.4471	0.0502	-8.8979	0.0000***	
<i>i</i> _{A2}	0.3093	0.0837	3.6952	0.0002***	0.3854	0.0753	5.1212	0.0000***	
і_{В1}	0.0045	0.0024	1.9070	0.0565*	0.0046	0.0021	2.1300	0.0332**	
r _{A1}	-0.0099	0.0044	-2.2356	0.0254**	-0.0118	0.0040	-2.9320	0.0034***	
<i>i</i> _{A1} (−1)	0.1620	0.0559	2.8999	0.0037***	0.1446	0.0479	3.0178	0.0026***	
<i>i_{A2}</i> (-1)	0.5673	0.0823	6.8972	0.0000***	0.5206	0.0710	7.3349	0.0000***	
r _{sP}	0.0061	0.0067	0.9192	0.358	0.0018	0.0062	0.2833	0.777	
Hausman test	(3)	7.0408	<i>p</i> -value	0.0706					
Sargan test (20	6)	25.5065	<i>p</i> -value	0.4905					
Godfrey test		3.7973	<i>p</i> -value	0.2842					
Jarque-Bera te	est	1.4157	<i>p</i> -value	0.4927					
Equation 2 –	Dependent	variable: <i>i</i> _{A2}							
var.	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	
μ_2	0.1052	0.0798	1.3194	0.1870	0.1378	0.0712	1.9349	0.0530*	
<i>i_{A1}</i>	0.9687	0.1020	9.4942	0.0000***	1.0054	0.0914	10.9945	0.0000***	
i _{B2}	0.0065	0.0055	1.1852	0.2360	0.0072	0.0044	1.6321	0.1027	
r _{A2}	0.0263	0.0054	4.9078	0.0000***	0.0251	0.0050	5.0502	0.0000***	
<i>i_{A1}</i> (-1)	-0.2870	0.1199	-2.3944	0.0167**	-0.2980	0.1030	-2.8924	0.0038***	
<i>i</i> _{A1} (−2)	0.1850	0.0884	2.0928	0.0364**	0.1511	0.0705	2.1445	0.0320**	
<i>i_{B2}</i> (−1)	-0.0132	0.0050	-2.6302	0.0085***	-0.0122	0.0044	-2.7912	0.0053***	
r _{sP}	0.0075	0.0101	0.7385	0.4602	0.0073	0.0094	0.7779	0.4366	
ipores	0.6343	0.3555	1.7844	0.0744*	0.2927	0.2809	1.0418	0.2975	
Hausman test	(3)	2.915	<i>p</i> -value	0.4049					
Sargan test (24)		34.1913	<i>p</i> -value	0.0813					
Godfrey test		3.7865	<i>p</i> -value	0.2855					
Jarque-Bera te	est	17.077	<i>p</i> -value	0.0002					

Table 3: Investors' number

Equation 3 - Dependent variable: <i>i</i> _{B1}									
var.	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	
μ_3	-2.0807	0.3570	-5.8283	0.0000***	-2.1376	0.3238	-6.6006	0.0000***	
<i>i_{A1}</i>	0.4462	0.4952	0.9011	0.3676	0.3625	0.3988	0.9088	0.3635	
і _{В2}	0.0384	0.0462	0.8312	0.4059	0.0363	0.0400	0.9066	0.3646	
r _{B1}	-0.0186	0.0329	-0.5653	0.5718	-0.0122	0.0292	-0.4174	0.6764	
<i>i_{B1}</i> (−1)	0.7368	0.2641	2.7899	0.0053***	0.7886	0.2037	3.8720	0.0001***	
<i>i</i> _{B1} (−2)	0.1422	0.0492	2.8902	0.0039***	0.1613	0.0379	4.2506	0.0000***	
<i>i_{B2}</i> (−1)	1.2114	0.0480	25.2375	0.0000***	1.2352	0.0404	30.6073	0.0000***	
<i>i_{B2}</i> (−2)	-1.1643	0.3736	-3.1164	0.0018***	-1.2632	0.2876	-4.3924	0.0000***	
C _{B1}	0.2818	0.0682	4.1320	0.0000***	0.2911	0.0560	5.1938	0.0000***	
C _{B2}	-0.3994	0.0698	-5.7221	0.0000***	-0.4047	0.0577	-7.0103	0.0000***	
r _{sP}	0.0195	0.0844	0.2310	0.8175	0.0185	0.0715	0.2583	0.7962	
Hausman tes	st (3)	14.8321	<i>p</i> -value	0.0020					
Sargan test (24)	29.5478	<i>p</i> -value	0.1299					
Godfrey test		4.1573	<i>p</i> -value	0.2450					
Jarque-Bera	test	31.8051	<i>p</i> -value	0.0000					
Equation 4 -	- Dependent	variable: i _{B2}							
var.	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	
μ_4	-0.5254	0.2594	-2.0254	0.0428**	-0.5404	0.2485	-2.1752	0.0296**	
<i>i</i> _{A2}	0.0941	0.3567	0.2638	0.7920	0.0864	0.3462	0.2495	0.8030	
i _{B1}	0.3393	0.0311	10.9257	0.0000***	0.345	0.0287	12.037	0.0000***	
r _{B2}	-0.0087	0.0221	-0.3939	0.6937	-0.011	0.0207	-0.5303	0.5959	
r _{sP}	0.1597	0.0668	2.3909	0.0168**	0.1820	0.0623	2.9238	0.0035***	
opchi	65.0968	2.4536	26.5311	0.0000***	64.7772	2.2598	28.6654	0.0000***	
prodev	-8.6561	2.4192	-3.5781	0.0004***	-6.9397	2.0869	-3.3254	0.0009***	
Hausman tes	st (3)	5.6615	<i>p</i> -value	0.1293					
Sargan test (26)	20.8647	<i>p</i> -value	0.7489					
Godfrey test		1.5023	<i>p</i> -value	0.6817					
Jarque-Bera	test	66.132	<i>p</i> -value	0.0000					
		2SLS Esti	mation			3SLS Es	timation		

Ambiguous returns influence: The relationship between the investors' number and the stock market return is ambiguous for i_{A1} , while for *B*-shares this is not relevant. On the SZSE a significant and positive relationship of r_{A2} to i_{A2} reveals a traditional link of market performances to stock investments. To the contrary, the significant and negative relationship of i_{A1} with r_{A1} may appear surprising, but also fascinating: this may represent a sort of anti-cyclical behaviour of the Chinese savers. In fact, an increase (decrease) in stock investment accounts should be related to a prudential (opportunistic) reaction to the stock index decrease (increase). Nevertheless, this induces the suspicion that investors' behaviour is affected by irrationality of Chinese savers, pulled towards, or against, the stock exchange investment by a set of reasons, barely explained by the stock market fundamentals. We can refer to emotional or imitative behaviour, but we may also figure out the presence of a compulsory need for savings allocation. Regulatory insensitivity and untrustworthiness: we use all the nine regulatory dummies of Table 2 in a preliminary OLS setting (9) and find out that five of them (indir, cgov, gfii, ipospon and intprot) do not have any effect at all. So they have been used, tested and then rejected from our model, while the remaining four regulatory dummies do play some role in our system. As far as the investors' number is concerned, we notice the absence of statistical relevance for all the regulatory dummies on the Shanghai A-share investors' number. This should mean that the series of regulatory acts, during the observed period, do not affect the investment choices of Chinese savers, especially in the mainland leader Stock Exchange. In the SZSE only the public offering resumption of May 2005 (ipores) has any kind of effect. The B segment is obviously positively affected by the opchi dummy, which represents the act that allowed the Chinese savers to invest in the B-share market that is generally reserved for foreigners. Nevertheless, the dicotomical variable prodev, referring to a measure addressed to develop and open up the Chinese Stock Exchanges, is relevant but negatively affects the SZSE *B*-share investors' number: this may represent a clear signal of the weak trustworthiness of the investors operating in China, which arises when new legal measures regarding the financial market soundness are issued.

4.2 Trading Volumes

Table 4, regarding trading volumes, confirms the previous findings: wave-effects and imitative behaviours, investment memory and a general regulatory insensitivity. Only the *opchi* dummy positively affects the trading activity but with reference only to the SZSE *A*-market segment.

- Democratisation strengths are significant for the SHSE A-market. We refer to the negative relationship between the stock trading volumes (v_{A1}) and the number of stock investment accounts (i_{A1}). This could mean that the larger the stock investment basis is in the SHSE, the lower the average trading activity is. This suggests that a large number of new investors may not feel comfortable with stock trading. When the investors' basis increases, the probability of having smaller shareholders negotiating lower quantity of stocks (or not to negotiate at all) augments. Nevertheless, this relationship is not relevant for the other markets;
- *Emotional trends*, are revealed by the relationship of v_{A2} and v_{B1} with the performances of the S&P monthly return. This is particularly strange if we keep in mind that *A*-share investors are mainly Chinese and they are not allowed to invest abroad. Therefore, this connection may reflect an emotional or an irrational influence upon the Chinese stock trading activity, as carried out by international stock markets trends;

_					
Т	able -	4: Tr	ading	volun	nes

Equation 5 – Dependent variable: v_{A1}										
var. c	oeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value		
μ_5 3.7	'160 <u> </u> 3	3.5693	1.0411	0.2978	3.2188	3.3168	0.9704	0.3318		
i _{A1} -7.8	941 3	3.1064	-2.5413	0.0110**	-6.7909	2.8875	-2.3518	0.0187**		
V _{A2} 0.2	2530 C).0831	3.0438	0.0023***	0.3141	0.0765	4.1053	0.0000***		
V _{B1} 0.2	201 0	0.0566	3.8866	0.0001***	0.1811	0.0511	3.5443	0.0004***		
r _{A1} 0.9	024 0).5169	1.7458	0.0809*	0.9819	0.4741	2.0713	0.0383**		
<i>v</i> _{A1} (-1) -0.0	1893 C	0.0538	-1.6610	0.0967*	-0.1154	0.0489	-2.3614	0.0182**		
<i>W</i> _{A1} 0.7	'500 C).4143	1.8100	0.0703*	0.6877	0.3644	1.8875	0.0591*		
<i>σ</i> _{A1} -0.8	3279	1.546	-0.5355	0.5923	-0.6671	1.4122	-0.4724	0.6367		
<i>r_{SP}</i> 0.9)895 C).6444	1.5355	0.1247	0.6896	0.6066	1.1368	0.2556		
Hausman test (4)		8.026	<i>p</i> -value	0.0906						
Sargan test (24)	31	1.8245	<i>p</i> -value	0.1314						
Godfrey test	4	1.3448	<i>p</i> -value	0.2266						
Jarque-Bera test	1	1.7542	<i>p</i> -value	0.4160						
Equation 6 - Depe	ndent var	riable: v _{A2}								
var. c	oeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value		
μ ₆ -6.6	6036 4	1.0996	-1.6108	0.1072	-5.5724	3.6395	-1.5311	0.1258		
i _{A2} -4.3	3024 4	1.1943	-1.0258	0.3050	-4.0766	3.7797	-1.0785	0.2808		
V _{A1} 0.9	106 C).1353	6.7324	0.0000***	1.0368	0.1138	9.1110	0.0000***		
<i>r</i> _{A2} 0.3	163 C).6053	0.5226	0.6012	-0.0521	0.5112	-0.1018	0.9189		
$v_{A2}(-1)$ 0.0	0471 C	0.0596	0.7898	0.4296	0.0920	0.0506	1.8197	0.0688*		
<i>W</i> _{A2} 0.1	713 C).5713	0.2999	0.7643	0.0604	0.4647	0.1299	0.8966		
σ_{A2} 2.9	005 1	1.5749	1.8416	0.0655*	2.2586	1.3199	1.7111	0.0871*		
r _{SP} 1.5	i913 C).7532	2.1127	0.0346**	1.7017	0.6714	2.5346	0.0113**		
opchi 222	.153 30).0404	7.3951	0.0000***	204.531	25.8582	7.9097	0.0000***		
Hausman test (3)	1	.5802	<i>p</i> -value	0.6639						
Sargan test (24)	22	2.6472	<i>p</i> -value	0.5407						
Godfrey test	C	.8888	<i>p</i> -value	0.8281						
Jarque-Bera test	25	54.965	<i>p</i> -value	0.0000						
Equation 7 – Depe	ndent var	riable: v _{B1}								
var. coeff.	s.e	. t-st	tat	p-value	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value		
μ ₇ -0.0	697 3	3.5622	-0.0196	0.9844	0.1468	3.21	0.0457	0.9635		
<i>i_{B1} -</i> 0.1	702 0).3442	-0.4944	0.6210	-0.1156	0.2796	-0.4134	0.6793		
V _{B2} 0.6	5139 C).0924	6.6416	0.0000***	0.738	0.0735	10.0472	0.0000***		
<i>V_{A1}</i> 0.1	224 0).1494	0.8195	0.4125	0.1121	0.1157	0.9694	0.3324		
<i>r</i> _{B1} 0.4	440 C).3631	1.2228	0.2214	0.1372	0.3062	0.4482	0.654		
<i>v</i> _{B1} (−1) -0.0	180 C).0430	-0.4187	0.6754	0.0012	0.0355	0.0324	0.9742		
<i>v</i> _{B1} (−2) -0.1	342 C).0461	-2.9113	0.0036***	-0.0687	0.0379	-1.8144	0.0696*		
w _{B1} 0.7	'145 C).2866	2.4934	0.0127**	0.4320	0.2377	1.8174	0.0692*		
σ _{B1} 0.0	842 C).5492	0.1533	0.8782	0.1119	0.4673	0.2394	0.8108		
<i>r</i> _{SP} 1.3	706	0.779	1.7595	0.0785*	0.8049	0.6907	1.1653	0.2439		
Hausman test (4)	12	2.5018	<i>p</i> -value	0.0140						
Sargan test (23)	14	1.7022	<i>p</i> -value	0.9050						
Godfrey test	3	3.7371	<i>p</i> -value	0.2913						
Jarque-Bera test	C).1923	<i>p</i> -value	0.9083						

Equation 8 – Dependent variable: v _{B2}										
var.	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value		
μ_8	0.2206	3.3873	0.0651	0.9481	0.175	3.0375	0.0576	0.9541		
<i>і</i> _{В2}	-0.4415	0.3238	-1.3634	0.1728	-0.1205	0.2634	-0.4574	0.6474		
V _{B1}	0.7744	0.1022	7.5806	0.0000***	0.8756	0.0788	11.1092	0.0000***		
r _{B2}	0.9135	0.3796	2.4062	0.0161**	0.5694	0.3150	1.8077	0.0707*		
<i>v_{B2}</i> (−1)	-0.1245	0.0369	-3.3705	0.0008***	-0.1282	0.0306	-4.1951	0.0000***		
<i>v</i> _{B2} (−2)	-0.0779	0.0434	-1.7940	0.0728*	-0.0397	0.0346	-1.1484	0.2508		
<i>v_{B2}</i> (-3)	-0.0665	0.0307	-1.7985	0.0721*	-0.0575	0.0270	-2.1296	0.0332**		
W _{B2}	0.3653	0.3054	1.1960	0.2317	0.2277	0.2447	0.9303	0.3522		
$\sigma_{\rm B2}$	-0.2756	0.4973	-0.5541	0.5795	-0.2968	0.4189	-0.7084	0.4787		
r _{sP}	0.0282	0.7194	0.0392	0.9687	-0.3378	0.6376	-0.5298	0.5962		
Hausman te	est (3)	1.8960	<i>p</i> -value	0.5943						
Sargan test	(23)	28.3574	<i>p</i> -value	0.2026						
Godfrey test		7.9266	<i>p</i> -value	0.0476						
Jarque-Bera test		0.9556	<i>p</i> -value	0.6202						
		2SLS Est			3SLS Es	timation				

Risk drivers: the trading volumes of the leader market (SHSE) are positively affected by the weighted average price/earning (P/E) ratios (variables w_{A1} and w_{B1}). This should mean that the more, on average, the Chinese stocks are overvalued (high P/E ratio), the more frenetic the market activities become. As a consequence, this should reveal the presence of speculative bubble risks, which will be confirmed by the stock index estimations. The variance σ_{A2} , a traditional measure of market risk, seems to play some role only in equation 6.

4.3 Stock Index Returns

Table 5 contains the estimation of the equations referred to stock index returns foundations, from which we notice the following findings.

Equation 9 – Dependent variable: r_{A1}										
var.	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value		
μ ₉	0.7278	0.2628	2.7689	0.0056***	0.7298	0.2415	3.0212	0.0025***		
r _{A2}	0.6081	0.0808	7.5240	0.0000***	0.6288	0.0717	8.7702	0.0000***		
<i>i</i> _{A1}	0.1386	0.1861	0.7446	0.4565	0.0923	0.1743	0.5294	0.5965		
W _{A1}	0.0734	0.0283	2.5906	0.0096***	0.0606	0.0259	2.3402	0.0193**		
W _{A2}	0.1983	0.0696	2.8505	0.0044***	0.1919	0.0617	3.1109	0.0019***		
C _{A1}	-0.2545	0.0815	-3.1221	0.0018***	-0.2370	0.0718	-3.3029	0.0010***		
σ_{A1}	-0.1323	0.0946	-1.3993	0.1617	-0.1521	0.0869	-1.7501	0.0801*		
Hausman test	t (2)	3.0817	<i>p</i> -value	0.2142						
Sargan test (26)		32.3501	<i>p</i> -value	0.1818						
Godfrey test		2.4119	<i>p</i> -value	0.4914						
Jarque-Bera t	est	0.0600	<i>p</i> -value	0.9704						

Equation 10 – Dependent variable: <i>r</i> _{A2}									
var.	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	
μ_{10}	0.3138	0.2734	1.1474	0.2512	0.2336	0.2432	0.9607	0.3367	
r _{A1}	0.6178	0.1144	5.3981	0.0000***	0.7152	0.0956	7.4823	0.0000***	
i _{A2}	0.2638	0.2343	1.1259	0.2602	0.1931	0.2156	0.8959	0.3703	
W _{A1}	0.0526	0.0363	1.4487	0.1474	0.0337	0.0312	1.0815	0.2795	
W _{A2}	0.3533	0.0770	4.5872	0.0000***	0.2976	0.0644	4.6226	0.0000***	
C _{A2}	-0.4268	0.0891	-4.7890	0.0000***	-0.3622	0.0739	-4.9037	0.0000***	
σ_{A2}	0.0522	0.0949	0.5502	0.5822	0.0526	0.0818	0.6430	0.5202	
Hausman tes	st (2)	7.6171	<i>p</i> -value	0.0222					
Sargan test (2	26)	21.4724	<i>p</i> -value	0.7172					
Godfrey test		3.0309	<i>p</i> -value	0.3869					
Jarque-Bera	test	9.9551	<i>p</i> -value	0.0069					
Equation 11	- Depender	nt variable:	г _{в1}						
var.	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	
μ_{11}	1.0318	0.7175	1.4379	0.1505	1.1871	0.5901	2.0117	0.0443**	
r _{B2}	0.1780	0.0747	2.3811	0.0173**	0.1612	0.0605	2.6638	0.0077***	
<i>і_{в1}</i>	-0.0903	0.0492	-1.8348	0.0665*	-0.0868	0.0397	-2.1891	0.0286**	
<i>i_{B1}</i> (−1)	0.0956	0.0309	3.0934	0.0020***	0.1110	0.0242	4.5838	0.0000***	
<i>i</i> _{B1} (−2)	0.1172	0.0267	4.3896	0.0000***	0.1135	0.0209	5.4397	0.0000***	
i _{A1}	2.3359	0.9246	2.5264	0.0115**	2.6896	0.7569	3.5532	0.0004***	
<i>i</i> _{A1} (−1)	-2.1276	0.8615	-2.4696	0.0135**	-2.4512	0.6897	-3.5541	0.0004***	
W _{A2}	0.1257	0.0556	2.2589	0.0239**	0.1464	0.0461	3.1737	0.0015***	
W _{B1}	0.6320	0.0458	13.8046	0.0000***	0.6157	0.0364	16.8984	0.0000***	
W _{B2}	0.0771	0.0624	1.2340	0.2172	0.0847	0.0494	1.7157	0.0862*	
C _{B1}	-0.9283	0.0751	-12.3661	0.0000***	-0.9431	0.0610	-15.4499	0.0000***	
σ_{B1}	0.0447	0.0610	0.7324	0.4639	0.0682	0.0492	1.3867	0.1655	
opchi	4.6790	2.8745	1.6278	0.1036	4.1757	2.3198	1.8000	0.0719*	
ipores	15.1742	3.0904	4.9101	0.0000***	12.9739	2.4769	5.2380	0.0000***	
seclaw	-9.0954	3.2810	-2.7721	0.0056***	-9.2950	2.5678	-3.6198	0.0003***	
Hausman tes	st (3)	4.4005	p-value	0.2213					
Sargan test (18)	33.9015	p-value	0.0130					
Godfrey test		0.8598	p-value	0.8351					
Jarque-Bera	test	15.8786	p-value	0.0004					
Equation 12	- Depender	nt variable:	r _{B2}						
var.	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	coeff.	s.e.	t-stat	p-value	
μ_{12}	0.6031	0.6673	0.9038	0.3661	0.6516	0.6074	1.0727	0.2834	
r _{B1}	0.1906	0.1006	1.8938	0.0583*	0.1504	0.0870	1.7292	0.0838*	
i _{B2}	0.0349	0.0636	0.5486	0.5833	0.0212	0.0572	0.3712	0.7105	
W _{B1}	0.0823	0.0824	0.9987	0.3179	0.0719	0.0684	1.0501	0.2937	
W _{B2}	0.6483	0.0553	11.7205	0.0000***	0.6747	0.0467	14.4430	0.0000***	
C _{B2}	-0.7484	0.1029	-7.2720	0.0000***	-0.7838	0.0886	-8.8463	0.0000***	
σ_{B2}	0.0427	0.0961	0.4445	0.6567	0.0462	0.0807	0.5726	0.5669	
Hausman tes	st (2)	15.0410	p-value	0.0005					
Sargan test (2	26)	36.0015	p-value	0.0916					
Godfrey test		4.1192	p-value	0.2489					
Jarque-Bera	test	99.9449	p-value	0.0000					
		2SLS E	stimation			3SLS E	stimation		

- *Market correlations*: there is a positive estimated correlation between the returns of the same kind of share and all these correlations are statistically relevant;
- *IPOs distrust*: the primary market structure could play a role in explaining the trend of the Chinese Stock Exchanges. Since the beginning, Chinese authorities chose to find their stock market growth through external expansion that means the issue of new shares, such as Initial Public Offering (IPOs), secondary placements (SPs) and follow-up offerings. On the contrary, the internal expansion, followed by many western stock exchanges, would have slowed down the breath of the stock markets in favour of the appreciation of existing stocks. The external growth of stock markets introduces a problem: further bids of capital could cause a sort of "dilution effect", making the existing stock prices suffer. This is reasonable if either the IPOs or SPs are competing for limited capital, or if investors distrust their quality. If the new offers are economically attractive and flows of capital are not limited, the external growth of the Exchanges can easily co-exist with a steady uptrend of their performances. In China, funds streaming towards stock markets cannot be imagined as limited. So, the significant and negative relationship between all the four return indicators (r_{A1} , r_{A2} , r_{B1} and r_{B2}) with their respectively net market values (c_{A1} , c_{A2} , c_{B1} and c_{B2}) may only be explained by a general disbelief in the fundamental attractiveness of the new listings;
- *Risk drivers* are provided by a remarkable relationship between all the four stock indexes and the relative P/E indicators. The market performances, as well as the trading volumes, seem to be strongly driven by the over evaluation (high P/E ratios) of listed shares. This may depend upon emotional and speculative behaviours. Instead, the traditional risk-return relationship between the variance $\sigma_{i,j}$ and the stock index performance is not relevant;
- Changing attitudes towards regulation: the regulatory insensitivity of A-share investors has been systematically confirmed in all of our estimations. Nevertheless, in equation 11 seclaw and ipores dummies cause two opposite effects: the former, related to the first regulatory act, is a decreasing level of trust in the market. The latter, on the other hand, refers to the more recent regulatory act considered in our analysis and its contribution is strong and positive. This may indicate a sign of a change in the attitude towards the regulative activity.

5. Concluding Remarks and Further Research

Through estimating a system of simultaneous equations, we find that the overall Chinese savers' attitude towards stock investment is affected by emotional and speculative behaviour, especially for the *A*-share segment of the market. Waves of new stock investment accounts are interconnected between the two Stock Exchanges and somehow also between *A*- and *B*-segments of the market, with a feeble (or unexpected) relationship with the stock market performances. This may

be coherent with behavioural finance conceptual findings (see for example Thaler and Barberis, 2003), and also with the abundance of savings looking for remunerative investment alternatives. The more imitative and "emotionally" driven market side is the A-share market. A more dominant role of the SHSE has also been identified, compared to the SZSE which acts as a follower.

Estimates referring to the trading volumes confirm emotional or imitative and speculative behaviour and risk driven market activities. In particular, the relevance of the average price/earning ratios in sustaining the trading activity may also suggest the presence of a speculative bubble. These emotional strengths are confirmed as being more evident for the A-share segment of the market, whose trading volumes paradoxically also react to the S&P performances.

Stock index returns are strongly correlated and negatively affected by the stock market enlargement, indeed we refer to a sort of IPOs distrust. Emotionalspeculative strengths are also evident, given the relevance of the P/E ratio in sustaining stock index returns.

The final remarkable result is related to the relevance of the regulatory dummies. Our findings suggest that savers' attitude towards stock investment, trading volumes and market returns are seldom affected by changes in the Chinese legal framework. The regulatory insensitivity of A-share investors (typically Chinese) has been systematically confirmed for the Chinese leader Stock Exchange (SHSE). A sporadic effect displayed by some dummies shows the widespread distrust of investors towards the Chinese financial legal system and this is particularly relevant for the initial regulation of 1999. Finally, signals of better attitudes towards the more recent legal acts are shown.

A possible extension of this work would be to carry out a cointegration analysis to enhance the system of equation (2): in particular taking into account the long run relationships between the endogenous variables. If any cointegration vector exists, we could also use some linear combination as an instrument in our analysis.

Endnotes

⁽¹⁾ See Weber (2004) and CSRC (2003, 2004 and 2005).

⁽²⁾ See King and Levine (1993), Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996), Levine (1996), Beck et al. (2000), Levine and Loayza (2000), Baier et al. (2003).

⁽³⁾ See Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and La Porta et al. (2000). ⁽⁴⁾ See Allen et al. (2005) and Lin (2004).

⁽⁵⁾ For example, on August 16th 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) promulgated the "Guidelines for Establishing Independent Directors of Listed Companies" to provide guidance concerning the independent directors in listed companies. On January 7th 2002, the CSRC and the State Economic and Trade Commission jointly issued the "Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies" which outlines the fundamental principles of corporate governance for listed companies. These principles ensure a basic level of investor protection, as well as codes of conduct and ethical standards for managers of listed companies (CSRC, 2004).

⁽⁶⁾ For all the equations of the system, the Godfrey test is always performed with 3 lags. For a detailed review of these tests see for example Davidson and MacKinnon (1993).

⁽⁷⁾ We mean consistency, asymptotic normality and invariance to monotonic transformations.

⁽⁸⁾ The only exception is equation 6, but the p-value of 0.0476 highlights that the rejection of the null hypothesis is weak.

⁽⁹⁾ To find out if the dummy variables have any effects upon the system's endogenous variable, we carried out a preliminary analysis based upon the estimation of the reduced form of the system (2) given by equation (3). The estimation simply consists of *n* OLS regressions in which the dummy variables of Table 2 belong to the vector x_t containing all the regressors.

References

- Allen F., Qian J., Qian M., 2005, "Law, finance, and economic growth in China", *Journal of Financial Economics* 77, 57-116
- Baier S., Dwyer G.P.Jr., Tamura R., 2003, "Does Opening a Stock Exchange Increase Economic Growth?", *Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta -Working Paper*, 2003-36.
- Beck, T., Levine R., Loayza N.V. 2000, "Finance and the Sources of Growth", *Journal of Financial Economics*, 58-2, 261-300.
- Chen, Z., 2003, "Capital markets and legal development: The China case", *China Economic Review*, Volume 14. 451-472.
- China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2005, *China's Securities and Futures Markets*. Annual Report.
- China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2004, *China's Securities and Futures Markets*. Annual Report.
- China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2003, *China's Securities and Futures Markets*. Annual Report.
- Claessens S., Fan J., 2002, "Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey", *International Review of Finance*, Volume 3, Issue 2, 71.
- Clarke D.C., 2003, "Corporate governance in China: an overview", *China Economic Review*, Volume 14, 494-507.
- Davidson R., MacKinnon J.G., 1993, <u>Estimation and inference in econometrics</u>, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Demirguc-Kunt, A., Levine, R., 1996, "Stock markets, corporate finance, and economic growth: an overview", *World Bank Economic Review*, 102, May, 223-239.

- Demirguc-Kunt, A., Maksimovic, V., 1998, "Law, finance, and firm growth", *Journal* of *Finance*, December, 536, 2107-2137.
- Hamilton J.D., 1994, Time series analysis, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Jefferson, G., Hu A.G., Yu, X., 2003, "Ownership, performance and innovation in China's large and medium-size industrial enterprise sector", *China Economic Review*, 141, 89-113.
- King, R. G., Levine R., 1993, "Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Growth", *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 32 December, 513-42.
- La Porta R., Lopez-De-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R., 2000, "Investor protection and corporate governance", *Journal of Financial Economics*, Vol. 58, Issue 1-2, 3-27.
- La Porta R., Lopez-De-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R., 2002, "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation", *The Journal of Finance*, Volume 57, Issue 3, 1147.
- La Porta R., Lopez-De-Sinales F., Shleifer A., 1999, "Corporate ownership around the world", *Journal of Finance*, 54 2, 471-517.
- Levine, R., 1996, "Stock markets: a spur to economic growth", *Finance and Development*, 331, March, 7-10.
- Levine, R., Zervos, S., 1998, "Stock markets, banks, and economic growth", *American Economic Review*, 88, 537-558.
- Lin T. W., 2004, "Corporate Governance in China: Recent Developments, Key Problems, and Solutions", *Journal of Accounting and Corporate Governance*, Vol. 1, pp. 1-23.
- Sargan J. D., 1988, Lectures on advanced econometrics theory, Blackwell, Oxford.
- Shleifer A., Vishny R., 1997, "A survey of corporate governance", *The Journal of Finance*, 52-2, 737-783.
- Thaler R., Barberis N. (2003), <u>A survey of behavioural finance</u>, Handbook of the economics of finance, Elsevier Science B.V.
- Wan C., 2005, "Ownership and operating performance of Chinese IPOs", *Journal of Banking and Finance*, Vol. 29, Issue 7, July, 1835-1856.
- Xu, X., Wang, Y., 1999, "Ownership structure and corporate governance in Chinese Stock Companies", *China Economic Review*, 10, 75-98.